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Conclusion:
These are the major questions raised by the present case. The
attempt here has been to define more exactly the scope of the decision
and to examine the implications of the constitutional issues considered
and the manner in which the Court solves them. The substance of the
Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, as seen by the Supreme
Court, is legislation in relation to reformation of a contract. In order
to satisfy this characterization of the legislation, it is necessary for
the Courts to insist that an applicant under the Act establish uncon-
scionable conduct apart from excessive cost. Only if the Act is so
applied will the far-reaching and unintentional implications be avoided
and the decision kept within its intended limits.
R.J.A.
Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, [19631 S.C.R. 651.
Lieberman v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 643.
The case of Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen' concerns the
judicial interpretation of the Lord's Day Act2 and the possibility that
section 4 of that Act is inoperative in the light of the intended effect
of section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights.3
It was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, Cartwright J.
dissenting, that section 4 of the Lord's Day Act was in no way a trans-
gression of the right preserved by section 2 of the Canadian Bill of
Rights, and that no limitation is imposed on a man's right to enjoy
freedom of religion simply because the Lord's Day Act requires him
to refrain from operating a commercial enterprise on Sunday.
The reasons of the learned judges in the majority were delivered
by Ritchie J. The argument is as follows:
Human rights and fundamental freedoms must be construed as
the rights and freedoms existing in Canada immediately before the
Canadian Bill of Rights was passed in 1960, for it is these rights
that are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and no others.4 Upon this
rather unwarranted assumption the Court then proceeds to determine
the meaning of religious freedom by adopting the observations of
Taschereau J., as he then was, in Chaput v. Romain5 and Rand J. in
Saumur v. City of Quebec and A.G. QWe., 6 concluding that religious
freedom means the right to think and act freely according to the
dictates of one's conscience so long as this thinking and acting does
not transgress a
civilized system of law which imposed limitations on the absolute liberty
of the individual.7
1 [19631 S.C.R. 651.
2 R.S.C. 1952, c. 171.
3 R.S.C. 1960, c. 44.
4 Supra footnote 1 at p. 491.
5 (1955) 1 D.L.R. (2d) 241 at p. 246, [1955] S.C.R. 299.
6 [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641 at p. 668.
7 Supra, footnote 1, p. 492.
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This conclusion is then fortified by reference to Duff J.'s observa-
tions in Re Alberta Legislations and the dissenting judgment of
Frankfurter J. in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,9
a United States Supreme Court case.
Against this background the Court distinguishes between the
effect and the purpose of the Lord's Day Act and stresses the need
to look to the effect of the Act rather than its original purpose, point-
ing out that even though the statute was originally enacted for the
purpose of preserving the sanctity of Sunday the contemporary effect
of the statute is purely secular. In other words, the fact that a non-
Christian must close his bowling alley on Sunday may effect an
economic inconvenience but this secular effect in no way infringes
on his right to follow the dictates of his conscience as far as religion
is concerned. In this sense, the Court holds, it cannot be said that
there has been any interference with the right of each individual
Canadian to practise the religion of his choice.
Cartwright J., however, refuses to adopt the Court's distinction
between the purpose and the effect of the Lord's Day Act and after
discussing the question of why the Lord's Day Act is within federal
jurisdiction he concludes that because the purpose of the statute was
to preserve the sanctity of Sunday, and because that preservation re-
quires persons who have no wish to sanctify Sunday to act in a certain
way (e.g. to close their bowling alley on Sunday), that requirement is
by definition an infringement of the right to freedom of religion.
In my opinion a law which compels a course of conduct whether positive
or negative, for a purely religious purpose infringes the freedom of
religion.10
It is suggested that Cartwright J.'s interpretation of the Lord's
Day Act is the only interpretation (in view of the relevant case law)
that does not offend a proper application of the wording of both
section 4 of the Lord's Day Act and section 2 of the Canadian Bill
of Rights. To this end then, it is submitted that the majority decision
is in error.
The cases cited by Ritchie J. in support of the majority decision,
while certainly substantiating the definition of "religious freedom"
adopted by the court, do not fit the conceptual framework within
which the court should have been working. Maintaining that human
rights and fundamental freedoms (such as the freedom of religion
preserved by section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights) must be con-
strued as the rights and freedoms that existed in Canada immediately
before the legislature passed the Bill of Rights is simply a way of
saying that the words "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms"
mean whatever they meant before 1960 and that the Canadian Bill
of Rights will merely preserve the status quo. This interpretation is
8 [1938J S.C.R. 100 at p. 133.
9 319 U.S. 624 at p. 653.
lo Supra footnote 1, at p. 488.
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consistent with preserving any type of prejudice so long as that
prejudice was able to pass unchallenged or unrecognized up to 1960,
and it is equally obvious that whatever else the legislature meant to
do when they passed the Bill of Rights they did not mean to preserve
any type of prejudice. In point of fact the Bill of Rights was passed
in order to give teeth to those who oppose prejudice in any form.
The Court was asked to define the concept of religious freedom
and to define it in such a way that it would reflect the true purport
of those words, but instead of doing this they begged the question by
blandly assuming that religious freedom did exist in Canada before
1960 (as delineated by the cases noted earlier).
They act on this assumption by judicially noticing that things
are now what they had been before 1960 and since this was so, ergo,
there could be no infringement of the right to freedom of religion.
To resort to authority in order to clarify what other judges have
thought about the concept in the past is an excellent method of putting
the problem in some kind of perspective, but it is more than a little
perverse to allow the principle of stare decisis to transmute classifica-
tion into decision. The court was not asked to substitute previously
accepted definitions of religious freedom (gleaned from cases whose
orientation and conceptual frame-work were not even similar) for
their own; they were asked to define religious freedom as they
understood it and then to decide if this definition was consistent with
the simultaneous operation of section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights
and section 4 of the Lord's Day Act.
But even assuming that the Supreme Court's definition of reli-
gious freedom would have been the same as the learned judges whose
opinions they adopted, if the Court had turned its mind to a fresh
analysis of these words found in a new statute, the further question
of whether the distinction between "the purpose and the effect" of a
statute such as the Lord's Day Act would justify the conclusion of
the court must be answered. What then is the purpose of the Lord's
Day Act? It seems implicit in the Robertson case, from the judgment
of Ritchie J., that the purpose of the statute was to govern the mor-
ality, in effect the behaviour, of Canadians. In so doing, of course,
the federal legislature is legislating under the power given it by
head 27 of section 91 of the British North America Act, i.e. criminal
law, and as such the Lord's Day Act is constitutional. Moreover, what
is implicit in the Robertson case has been made explicit in a host of
other decisions, that is to say the purpose of the Lord's Day Act was to
conserve public morality and sanctify Sunday as the Sabbath."1 As
Sedgewick J., speaking for the majority of the Court, said in relation
to the provincial statute then before him:
11 Cf. Ouimet v. Bazin (1912) 3 D.L.R. 593; Parish of St. Prosper v. Rod-
rique (1917) 40 D.L.R. 30, 31; Henry Birks & Sons v. Montreal and A.-G. Qite.
(1955) 5 D.L.R. (2d) 321.
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We cannot with propriety shut our eyes to the words of the title.12
Indeed, if the purpose of the Act had been any different it is a hard
question as was pointed out by the same Ritchie J. in delivering the
majority judgment in Lieberman v. The Queen,'3 whether or not the
federal legislature would have had the jurisdiction to enact such an
Act. But, while preserving the constitutionality of the Lord's Day
Act by reference to its purpose, the court does a complete about face
when they attempt to interpret the statute; they regard the purpose
as irrelevant; what is important is the effect, and that effect, they
conclude, is purely secular.
1 4
Certainly the original purpose of this statute infringes the other
statute, but the purpose of that original statute is not important now,
given all the economic and social changes that have taken place
between the time of the passing of the original statute and the present
day; what we must consider is the effect that this statute has on
the individuals it governs and determine whether or not this effect
infringes the rights that the individual has under the statute allegedly
in conflict with it.
It is not suggested that the effect of a statute is an unimportant
consideration when the meaning of the statute is being investigated.
Clearly the effect of a statute is often the most important test of
the constitutionality of the statute, but this method of interpretation
should not take the place of, or override the test of the purpose of
the legislature in enacting a statute. If such reasoning were carried
to its logical conclusion, the judiciary would have free rein to obstruct
the purpose of the legislature by simply pointing to some economic
or social change which they say renders the purpose of the legislation
irrelevant, and then substitute the effect (or what they consider to be
the effect) for a purpose which might seem a little out of line with
any intelligible interpretation of section 2 of the Bill of Rights.
In the Robertson case the Supreme Court has simply dressed
up the Lord's Day Act to coincide with the accepted words of what
is fair or unfair to the contemporary man. Whether this sense of
fairness springs from a religious conviction or simply from the belief
that a man should only be compelled to work so many hours a week
does not seem to matter. In point of fact when one considers both the
purpose and the effect of such labour legislation as The One Day's
Rest in Seven Act'5 it is a little difficult, in view of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Lord's Day Act, to reach any clear
conclusion as to exactly what the Lord's Day Act does in fact do,
that the One Day's Rest in Seven Act does not also accomplish. Yet
these statutes read very differently both in content and purport and it
12 O'Connor v. N.W. Telephone, 22 S.C.R. 276 at p. 293.
13 [1963] S.C.R. 643.
14 Cf., Laskin "Tests for Validity of Legislation under the British North
America Act: What's the matter?" 1955 U. of T. L.J. 114 at p. 117, for an
explanation of the methodology behind the 'effect' interpretation of statutes.
15 R.S.O. 1960, c. 269.
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would seem to be asking a little too much to seriously contend that
they both mean (even though they do not say) the same thing. Surely
it would not be asking too much to allow Parliament to perform their
function and to face changing economic and social conditions with
new legislation rather than distort the old to serve a purpose for
which it was never intended.
Suppose the distinction between the purpose of the statute and
its effect is accepted.16 The court held in the Robertson case that the
effect of the Lord's Day Act was purely secular and that since this
was true the conflict between section 4 of the Lord's Day Act and
section 2 of the Bill of Rights was merely illusory. The fact that a
man must close his bowling alley on Sunday in no way inhibits or
infringes upon his right to follow the religion of his choice. Super-
ficially, of course, this is true. But consider the ramifications. By
depriving a man of his right to earn money on a certain day in a
week will, in all probability, force him to keep his shop open on
another day which he may have set aside for his own religious obser-
vance.'17 The immediate effect is economic, but the collateral effect
is an infringement of the right of every Canadian to freedom of
religion. For any law which compels a certain course of conduct for
a purely religious purpose infringes freedom of religion, whether
that freedom is as defined by Rand J. in Chaput v. Romain'8 or by
the Oxford English Dictionary. Alternatively, if various labour laws
require a man to work only so many hours a week, then all other
things being equal he should be able to get Sunday off if he so chooses.
But it is to be noted that the right is an individual one, and provided
that he is bound by no other contractual obligations (such as union
agreements or licensing provisions) a man must, in view of even
the narrowest interpretation of section 2 of the Bill of Rights be
given the opportunity of opening a shop or bowling alley on Sunday.
Religious freedom amounts to more than telling a person that
he may practise his religion at the cost of economic security or than
attempting to rationalize religious prejudice by giving it the flavour
of labour legislation.
If the constitutionality of the Lord's Day Act is to be defended
at all then it might better be defended under head 27 of section 91 of
the British North America Act as governing the moral behaviour
of the citizens of Canada so as to come under the criminal law juris-
diction of the federal parliament.19 But in the Robertson case the
Supreme Court appears to interpret the statute as having nothing
more than a secular, regulative function much akin to various labour
laws, which are within the competency of the provincial legislature.
The horns of the dilemma are plain. Either the Lord's Day Act is
36 After all the Robertson case is now law in Canada.
17 Saturday in the case of Jews and Seventh Day Adventists; Friday In
the case of Mohammedans.18 Supra, footnote 6.
39 Supra, footnote 13, per Ritchie, J.
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constitutional, in which case the original purpose of that statute
must overshadow any other conceptual analysis in order to bring it
within head 27 of section 91 of the British North America Act; or
the Lord's Day Act is unconstitutional in view of the stress laid on
the secular, economic effects of the statute, a stress which drives
the pith and substance of the statute beyond the authority of the
federal legislature. In the former case the Act would be in plain
conflict with the right preserved by section 2 of the Canadian Bill of
Rights, and in the latter case the whole statute would be ultra vires
the federal legislature as pertaining to property and civil rights.
It is submitted that in view of the apparent religious partiality
of the provisions of the Lord's Day Act, it should be the subject of
close scrutiny with a view to either scrapping the whole Act as
anachronistic and unnecessary or reconciling its provisions with a
realistic interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
R.J.S.
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, v. Imperial
Oil Ltd. et al., [1963] S.C.R. 584.
HAa.: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel?
POL.: By the mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed.
HAa.: Methinks it is like a weasel.
POL.: It is backed like a weasel.
HAa.: Or like a whale?
POL.: Very like a whale. Ham~et, mI:2, lines 380 if.
Introduction
The Supreme Court of Canada has decided that a provincial gov-
ernment may legislate to clip the wings of its political opponents. In
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Imperial
Oil Ltd.,' a divided court dismissed the appeal of the Union attacking
the constitutional validity of s. 9(6) (c) (i) and (d) of the Labour
Relations Act of B.C.2 In so doing it affirmed the unanimous decision
of a five man B.C. Court of Appeal. That Court in its turn had upheld
the decision of Whittaker J. in the B.C. Supreme Court.
On March 27, 1961, subsection 6 was added to section 9 of the
Labour Relations Act. Subsection 6 (c) (i) states:
No trade-union and no person acting on behalf of a trade-union shall
directly or indirectly contribute to or expend on behalf of any political
party or to or on behalf of any candidate for political office any moneys
deducted from an employee's wages under subsection (1) or a collective
agreement, or paid as a condition of membership in the trade-union.3
As a result the respondent company refused to remit funds in
conformity with an existing collective bargaining agreement with
1 [1963] S.C.R. 584.
2 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 205, as am. by 1961 c. 31.
3 Ibid.
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